The evidence was crucial because it undermined the official
explanation that Hani Hanjour crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into
the
pentagon at high speed after executing an extremely difficult top
gun maneuver. But to understand how all of this played out, let us
review the case in bite-size pieces…
In August 2004 when the 9/11 Commission completed its official
investigation of the September 11, 2001 attack, the commission
transferred custody of its voluminous records to the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA).[1] There, the records remained under
lock and key for four and a half years, until last January when NARA
released a fraction of the total for public viewing. Each day, more of
the released files are scanned and posted on the Internet, making them
readily accessible. Although most of the newly-released documents are
of little interest, the files I will discuss in this article contain
important new information.
As we know, the 9/11 Commission did not begin its work until
2003–––more than a year after the fact. By this time a number of
journalists had already done independent research and published
articles about various facets of 9/11. Some of this work was of
excellent quality. The Washington Post, for example,
interviewed aviation experts who stated that the plane allegedly
piloted by Hani Hanjour [AA Flight 77] had been flown “with
extraordinary skill, making it highly likely that a trained pilot was
at the helm.”[2] Yet, strangely, when other journalists investigated
Hani Hanjour they found a trail of clues indicating he was a novice
pilot, wholly incapable of executing a top gun maneuver and a
successful suicide attack in a Boeing 757. By early 2003 this
independent research was a matter of public record, which created a
serious problem for the 9/11 Commission…
By all accounts Hani Hanjour was a diminutive fellow. He stood
barely five feet tall and was slight of build. As a young man in his
hometown of Taif, Saudi Arabia, Hanjour cultivated no great dreams of
flying airplanes. He was satisfied with a more modest ambition: he
wanted to become a flight attendant. That is, until his older brother
Abulrahman encouraged him to aim higher. Even so, Hani Hanjour’s
aptitude for learning appears to have been rather limited. Although he
resided in the US for about 38 months over a ten-year period that ended
on 9/11, Hanjour never learned to speak or write English, a telling
observation about his capacity for learning. As we will discover, he
actually flunked a written test for a driver’s license just weeks
before 9/11.
While it is true that Hanjour trained at various flight schools in
the US, the evidence shows he was a perpetual novice. Hanjour dropped
out of his first school, the Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, located in
Oakland, after attending only a few classes. Next, he enrolled at
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), a flight school in Scottsdale,
Arizona. But his performance as a student at CRM was less than
adequate. Duncan K.M. Hastie, owner of the school, described Hanjour as
“a weak student” who was “wasting our resources.”[3] After several
weeks, Hanjour withdrew from the program, then returned in 1997 for
another short period of instruction. This on and off pattern of
behavior was typical of the man. Hastie says that over the next three
years Hanjour called him at least twice a year, and each time wanted to
return for more training. By this time, however, it was obvious to
Hastie that his erstwhile student had no business in a cockpit. Hastie
refused to let Hanjour come back. “I would recognize his voice,” Hastie
said. “He was always talking about wanting more training. Yes, he
wanted to be an airline pilot. That was his stated goal. That’s why I
didn’t allow him to come back. I thought ‘You’re never going to make
it’.”[4]
Rejected by CRM, Hanjour enrolled at nearby Sawyer Aviation, also
located in the Phoenix area. Wes Fults, a former instructor at Sawyer,
later described it as the school of last resort. Said Fults: “it was a
commonly held truth that, if you failed anywhere else, go to Sawyer.”
Fults remembers training Hanjour, whom he describes as “a neophyte.” He
says Hani “got overwhelmed with the instruments” in the school’s flight
simulator. “He had only the barest understanding of what the
instruments were there to do,” said Fults. “He [Hanjour] used the
simulator three or four times, then disappeared like a fog.”[5] I must
emphasize to the reader, I am not making this up. Other accounts by Newsday, the New York Times, as well as the FOX network, all confirm that Hani Hanjour was at best a novice pilot.
Evading the Language Requirement
In fact, because fluency in English is required to qualify for a US
pilot’s license, Hanjour’s atrocious English should have barred him
from ever obtaining a license. But it seems that Hanjour exploited a
loophole in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) system, which for
years has outsourced the pilot certification process. According to a
June 2002 story in the Dallas Morning News, Hanjour was
certified in April 1999 as an “Airplane Multi-Engine Land/Commercial
Pilot” by Daryl Strong, one of the FAA’s 20,000 designated pilot
examiners.[6] Although an FAA official later defended the agency’s
policy of using private contractors, a critic, Heather Awsumb, took
issue with it. Awsumb is a spokesperson for the Professional Airways
Systems Specialists (PASS) Union, which represents more than 11,000 FAA
and Defense Department employees. She pointed out that the FAA does not
have anywhere near enough staff to oversee its 20,000 designated
inspectors, all of whom have a financial interest in certifying as many
pilots as possible. Hanjour probably evaded the language requirement by
finding an examiner willing to ignore the rule. Said Awsumb: “They
receive between $200 and $300 for each flight check. If they get a
reputation for being too tough, they won’t get any business.” According
to Awsumb, the present system allows “safety to be sold to the lowest
bidder.”[7]
Later, Hanjour’s horrible English prompted one flight school, Jet
Tech, to question the authenticity of his FAA-approved pilot’s license.
Jet Tech was another school in the Phoenix area where Hanjour sought
continuing instruction. Peggy Chevrette, operation manager at Jet Tech,
later told FOX News: “I couldn’t believe that he had a license of any
kind with the skills that he had.”[8] She explained that Hanjour’s
English was so bad it took him five hours to complete an oral exam that
normally should have taken about two.
But it wasn’t just his poor English that failed to impress. In his
evaluation the Jet Tech flight instructor wrote that the “student
[Hanjour] made numerous errors during his performance and displayed a
lack of understanding of some basic concepts. The same was true during
review of systems knowledge….I doubt his ability to pass an FAA [Boeing
737] oral at this time or in the near future.” The 737 instructor
concluded his evaluation with a final entry: “He [Hanjour] will need
much more experience flying smaller A/C [aircraft] before he is ready
to master large jets.”[9] The 9/11 Commission Report fails to
discuss or even mention this negative written evaluation, even while
presenting Hanjour’s substandard performance in a Boeing 737 simulator
as sufficient evidence that Hanjour could fly a Boeing 757, an even
larger plane![10] The wording of the final report succeeds in giving
this impression, however dubious, even while obscuring the facts: an
amazing achievement of propaganda.
Early in 2001, Peggy Chevrette, the operation manager at Jet Tech,
repeatedly conveyed her concerns about Hanjour to the FAA. Eventually
John Anthony, a federal inspector, showed up at the school and examined
Hanjour’s credentials. But Anthony found them in order and took no
further action. The inspector even suggested that Jet Tech provide
Hanjour with an interpreter. This surprised Chevrette because it was a
violation of FAA rules. “The thing that really concerned me,” she later
told FOX News, “Was that John had a conversation in the hallway with
Hani and realized what his skills were at that point and his ability to
speak English.”[11] Evidently, the inspector also sat in on a class
with Hanjour.
FOX News was unable to reach John Anthony for
comment, but FAA spokesperson Laura Brown defended the FAA employee.
“There was nothing about the pilot’s actions” she said, “to signal
criminal intent or that would have caused us to alert law
enforcement.”[12] This is true enough. The Jet Tech staff never
suspected that Hani Hanjour was a terrorist. According to Marilyn
Ladner, vice-president Pan Am International, the company that owned Jet
Tech, “It was more of a very typical instructional concern that ‘you
really shouldn’t be in the air’.”[13] Although Pan Am dissolved its Jet
Tech operation shortly after 9/11, a former employee who knew Hanjour
expressed amazement “that he [Hanjour] could have flown into the
pentagon. [because] He could not fly at all.”[14]
The “Scouting” Flights
We know that in the months before the September 11, 2001 attack Hani
Hanjour rented planes at several small airports on the outskirts of New
York City and Washington DC. The 9/11 Commission Report
mentions these local flights and suggests that Hanjour was scouting the
terrain: familiarizing himself with possible suicide targets.[15] But
the record also shows the same pattern described above. For example, on
May 29, 2001 Hanjour rented a plane at a small airport in Teterboro,
New Jersey and flew “the Hudson Tour,” accompanied by a flight
instructor. However, the next day, when Hanjour returned for a repeat
flight the same instructor “would not allow it because of Hanjour’s
poor piloting skills.”[16] The 9/11 Commission Report actually cites this incident, but in a context that diminishes its significance.[17]
The pattern played out again on August 16-17, 2001 when Hanjour
attempted to rent a plane at Freeway Airport, in Bowie, Maryland, about
twenty miles from Washington. Although Hanjour presented his FAA
license, according to Newsday the Freeway Airport manager insisted that
instructors first accompany him on a test flight to evaluate his
piloting skills. During three such flights over two days in a
single-engine Cessna 172, instructors Sheri Baxter and Ben Conner
observed what others had before them. Hanjour had trouble controlling
and landing the aircraft. Afterward, Baxter interviewed Hanjour
extensively about his flight training and experience, and also reviewed
his flight log, which documented 600 hours of flight time. On this
basis she and Conner declined to approve a current license rating until
Hanjour returned for more training. On their recommendation, Freeway’s
chief instructor Marcel Bernard refused to rent Hanjour a plane.[18]
Notice, this was less than a month before 9/11. When I reached Bernard
by phone he confirmed the details of the story by Newsday.[19] So did
Ben Conner when I spoke with him.[20] Conner also emphasized that the
issue was not simply Hanjour’s poor English. It was everything, i.e.,
his general ineptitude.
Curiously, The 9/11 Commission Report acknowledges
Hanjour’s poor English and sub-standard flying skills. The report even
mentions that flight instructors had urged Hanjour to give up trying to
become a pilot.[21] Strangely, however, another passage (in a footnote)
describes Hanjour as “the [al Qaeda] operation’s most experienced
pilot,” suggesting that the commission had a mixed opinion about
Hanjour.[22] In the end the official investigation evidently
interpreted Hanjour’s FAA license as sufficient proof that he had
“persevered” in overcoming his issues.[23] The word “persevered” is
straight out of the report.
But why did the commission ignore the multiple open-sourced accounts
cited above, all mutually corroborative, indicating that Hanjour would
have been lost in the cockpit of a Boeing 757 and was barely qualified
to fly a single-engine Cessna? It is notable that The 9/11 Commission Report
fails to mention the negative written evaluation by Hanjour’s Jet Tech
flight instructor. The omission is serious because a glance at the
timeline shows that Hanjour’s 5-6 weeks of training at Jet Tech
occurred in February-March 2001, that is, after he had already earned
his FAA license. Perseverance obviously was not enough. The
instructor’s negative evaluation was based on Hanjour’s actual
skill-set at the time, license or no license. Nor does the final report
so much as mention Hanjour’s test flight at Freeway airport, or the
fact that he failed it. These are telling omissions. Obviously, the
commission screened out testimony that conflicted with the official
narrative of what happened on that terrible day. But there is more to
the story. As we are about to learn, the recently released 9/11 files
have raised important new questions.
The Other Flight Instructor
It turns out that just three days after Hani Hanjour failed a flight
evaluation in a Cessna 172 at Freeway airport he showed up at
Congressional Air Charter, located down the road at Gaithersburg
airport, also in the Washington suburbs. Once again Hanjour attempted
to rent a plane, and again he was asked to go up with an instructor for
a flight evaluation to confirm his flight skills. The plane was the
same: a Cessna 172. Yet, on this occasion Hanjour passed with flying
colors and, later, this other instructor gave testimony to the 9/11
Commission that turned out to be crucial. The final report mentions the
instructor’s name only once in a brief endnote buried at the back of
the report. The note states:
“Hanjour successfully conducted a challenging
certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air
Charter of Gaithersburg, Maryland, landing at a small airport with a
difficult approach. The instructor thought Hanjour may have had
training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition
system for navigation. Eddie Shalev interview. (Apr. 9, 2004)” [24]
The note gives a name, Eddie Shalev, but no other information about
him. Indeed, his identity remained a mystery until January 2009, when
NARA released the 9/11 files.[25] Nonetheless, David Ray Griffin had
already identified the key questions in his 2008 book The New Pearl Harbor Revisited.
Wrote Griffin: “How could an instructor in Gaithersburg [i.e., Shalev]
have had such a radically different view of Hanjour’s abilities from
that of all of the other flight instructors who worked with him? Who
was this instructor? How could this report be verified?”[26]
These are important questions because the two assessments of Hani
Hanjour’s flight skills are so radically different that both cannot be
correct. The evaluations, made just days apart, are contradictory,
hence, mutually exclusive; which raises the disturbing possibility that
someone could be lying.
The FBI File
Fortunately, another newly released document, the FBI file on Hani
Hanjour, sheds additional light on the case.[27] The file includes a
timeline and evidently was compiled to document the government’s case
against Hanjour. I learned about it from a source on the commission, a
staffer who insisted to me in an email that it authenticates Hani
Hanjour’s flight training. At a glance it appears to do that. However,
on closer examination the file is much less impressive and I have to
wonder if the staffer actually studied it. As we will see, the document
not only falls short of confirming Hanjour’s flight skills, it shows
signs of having been “enhanced” to obscure the record.
Crucially, the FBI file includes not a scintilla of evidence that
Hani Hanjour ever trained in a Boeing 757. Although Hanjour did some
sessions a Boeing 737 simulator, as we have already seen, the press
accounts, more importantly, his own instructor’s written evaluation,
offer a clear and unambiguous assessment of his actual skills. It is
also important to realize that even if Hanjour had mastered the
controls of a Boeing 737, this would not have qualified him to execute
a high-speed suicide crash in a Boeing 757, a significantly larger and
less maneuverable aircraft. Such is the view of commercial pilots who
fly these planes every day.[28]
One such pilot, Philip Marshall, who is licensed to fly Boeing 727s,
737s, 747s, as well as 757s and 767s, recently authored a book, False Flag 911,
in which he states categorically that the alleged 9/11 hijacker pilots,
including Hani Hanjour, could never have flown 767s and 757s into
buildings at high speed without advanced training and practice flights
in that same aircraft over a period of months. As Marshall put it:
“Hitting a 90-foot target [i.e., the pentagon] with a 757 at 500 mph is
extremely difficult — absolutely impossible for first-time fliers of a
heavy airliner. It’s like seeing Tiger Woods hit a 300-yard one-iron
and someone telling you he never practiced the shot.”[29] Marshall
speculates that the hijackers may have received advanced flight lessons
from Arabic-speaking instructors at a secret desert base somewhere in
Arizona or Nevada, possibly arranged by complicit Saudi diplomats, or
by members of the Saudi royal family.[30] This is why Hanjour’s
inability to pass a test flight evaluation at Freeway airport just
weeks before 9/11 is so significant: It tends to rule out Marshall’s
theory of advanced instruction.
Close inspection of the FBI file also shows that someone padded the
record to put the best face on Hanjour’s flight training. This was done
in a curious way. Instead of simply informing us that Hanjour took
courses “x,” “y” and “z” at such-and-such a flight school between
certain dates, the FBI file gives an itemized record of every single day
that Hanjour showed up for training at the various schools. The effect
creates the appearance of more extensive instruction than actually
occurred. Even so, the enhancement is transparently obvious. Imagine
the reaction of a potential employer if you or I engaged in this
dubious practice in a resume. On closer examination, another reason for
padding the record is also obvious. Enhancement tends to obscure
Hanjour’s tendency to jump around from school to school and his
inability to finish anything he started.
The FBI file also conspicuously fails to mention the Jet Tech
instructor’s written evaluation of Hani Hanjour’s flying skills. The
omission easily qualifies as suppression of evidence because we know
the FBI had the document in its possession. It was made public at the
trial of Zacharias Moussaoui when the document was submitted as
evidence. This means, of course that the 9/11 Commission also surely
had it and similarly suppressed it. (See note #9.)
The FBI file also grossly mischaracterizes what happened at Freeway
airport. The file mentions Hanjour’s visits but wrongly states that
Hanjour received flight instruction. Not true. When I specifically
asked Marcel Bernard about this he denied the fact and emphasized that
Hanjour’s test flights included no lessons and were strictly for the
purpose of evaluation.[31] The FBI should have known this because after
9/11 Bernard and his two flight instructors notified the FBI about
Hanjour’s visit and were subsequently interviewed by FBI agents. The
file also conspicuously fails to mention that Hanjour flunked his test
flight evaluation! Whether through incompetence or deception, the FBI
failed on every point to state the facts correctly
The FBI file does offer some fresh insight into Hani Hanjour the
man. On August 2, 2001, according to the timeline, Hanjour showed up at
the Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in Arlington, where he
flunked a standard written test for a Virginia driver’s license. The
fact is astonishing and ought to make us wonder how Hanjour ever
managed to acquire his previous Arizona driver’s license issued in 1991
and his Florida license issued in 1996, let alone master the controls
of a Boeing 757.
There is another interesting item. The record indicates that on
September 5, 2001, just six days before 9/11, Hanjour showed up at the
First Union National Bank in Laurel, Maryland where he made four failed
bank transactions. The file cites bank records showing that Hanjour was
unable to make balance inquiries and withdraw funds from his account
because he failed to enter the correct pin number, which he evidently
had forgotten! Two days later, Hanjour returned to the bank, this time
accompanied by an unidentified male, and made another unsuccessful
attempt to withdraw $4900.
It is astonishing the FBI file was ever touted as authenticating
Hanjour’s flight credentials. The document falls short on that score
and actually raises new questions. How likely is it that a man who was
unable to remember his own pin number, and who just weeks before 9/11
flunked a simple test for a driver’s license, could have executed a top
gun maneuver in a commercial airliner? The odds, I would submit, are
approximately zero.
The FBI file includes one other curious entry. On August 20, 2001
Hanjour shopped at Travelocity.com for information about September 5,
2001 flights from Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles. This
suggests that as of August 20 Hanjour did not yet know the date of the
planned attack, either because he had not been briefed or because the
date had not yet been selected. By the end of the month, however, the
die was cast. On August 31 Hanjour and another “middle-eastern male”
purchased one-way tickets for AA Flight 77 from a New Jersey travel
agent. The date of departure: September 11, 2001. Yet, given Hanjour’s
level of skill, one has to wonder what the waif from Taif believed was
supposed to happen on that fateful morning.
So, Who is Eddie Shalev?
The record compiled by the FBI for the purpose of to authenticating
Hani Hanjour‘s flight skills fails to provide convincing
substantiation. Notice, for this reason it also fails to support the
testimony of the other flight instructor, Eddie Shalev, who certified
Hanjour to rent a Cessna 172 from Congressional Air Charters just three
days after Marcel Bernard, the chief instructor at Freeway, refused to
rent Hanjour the very same plane. The 9/11 Commission Report
makes no mention of the incident at Freeway airport, nor does it
discuss Eddie Shalev, other than alluding to Hanjour’s certification
flight in a brief endnote. All of which is curious, since it now
appears that Shalev’s testimony was crucial. By telling the commission
what it was predisposed to hear, Shalev gave the official investigation
an excuse to ignore the preponderance of evidence, which pointed to the
unthinkable.
So, who is Eddie Shalev? His identity remained unknown for more than
seven years, but was finally revealed in one of the files released in
January 2009 by the National Archives. The document, labelled a
“Memorandum for the Record,” is a summary of the April 2004 interview
with Eddie Shalev conducted by commission staffer Quinn John Tamm.[32]
The document confirms that Shalev went on record: “Mr Shalev stated
that based on his observations Hanjour was a ‘good’ pilot.” It is
noteworthy that Tamm also spoke with Freeway instructors Sheri Baxter
and Ben Conner, as revealed by yet another recently-released
document.[33] Although I was unable to reach Tamm or Baxter for
comment, I did talk with Conner, who confirmed the conversation.[34]
Conner says he fully expected to testify before the commission. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the call never came.
But the shocker is the revelation that Eddie Shalev is an Israeli
and served in the Israeli army. The file states that “Mr. Shalev served
in the Israeli Defense Forces in a paratroop regiment. He was a
jumpmaster on a Boeing C-130. Mr. Shalev moved to the Gaithersburg area
in April 2001 and was sponsored for employment by Congressional Air
Charters…[which] has subsequently gone out of business.”
The memorandum raises disturbing questions. Consider the staffer’s
strange choice of words in describing Shalev’s employment. What did
Quinn John Tamm mean when he wrote that Shalev “was sponsored for
employment”? Did the commission bother to investigate Congressional Air
Charters? It is curious that the charter service subsequently went out
of business. But the most important question is: just how thoroughly,
if at all, did the commission vet Eddie Shalev? Does his military
record include service in the Israeli intelligence community?
Real people have known addresses. But Eddie Shalev’s whereabouts has
been unknown for years. As reported by David Griffin, a 2007 search of
the national telephone directory, plus Google searches by research
librarian Elizabeth Woodworth, turned up no trace of him. A LexisNexis
search by Matthew Everett also came up dry.[35] Not satisfied, I
conducted my own search and did turn up two possible addresses for an
“Eddy Shalev” in the Gaithersburg-Rockville, Maryland area. But the
lead went nowhere. The phone number had been disconnected. The 9/11
memorandum indicates that Shalev’s US visa was about to expire in July
2004, suggesting that Shalev may have returned to Israel. Clearly, the
man needs to be found, subpoenaed and made to testify under oath before
a new investigation, even if this requires extradition. Quinn John Tamm
and the two Freeway instructors, Sheri Baxter and Ben Conner, should
also be subpoenaed. All are key witnesses and obvious starting points
for a new investigation.
Given his identity, the search for and possible extradition of Eddie
Shalev could become controversial. But 9/11 investigators must not be
turned aside. We must follow the trail of evidence, regardless. Should
it lead into a dark wood, we must resolve to go there; and if it takes
us to the gates of hell, so be it. Truly, no force, certainly no
political force, can withstand the power of truth. If and when our
search obtains a certain critical mass, momentum will shift decisively
in our favor. Public support for a new 9/11 investigation will become
irresistible. The light of truth will do the rest.
2 Marc Fisher and Don Phillips, “On Flight 77: ‘Our Plane is Being Hijacked’,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001.
3 Amy Goldstein, Lena H. Sun and George Lardner Jr., “Hanjour an Unlikely Terrorist,” The Cape Cod Times, October 21, 2001.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Kellie Lunney, “FAA contractors approved flight licenses for Sept. 11 suspect,” GovernmentExecutive.com, June 13, 2002.
8 “FAA Probed, Cleared Sept. 11 Hijacker in Early 2001,” FOX News, May 10, 2002.
9 Hani’s Jet Tech evaluation and other documentation were entered as
evidence during the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui. Training Records,
Hani Hanjour, B-737 Initial Ground Training, Class 01-3-021, Date:
2/8/01, Jet Tech International, posted at http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/prosecution…
10 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, W.W. Norton
& Co., New York, 2004, pp. 226-227.
11 “FAA Probed, Cleared Sept. 11 Hijacker in Early 2001,” FOX News, May 10, 2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Jim Yardley, “A Trainee Noted for Incompetence,” New York Times, May 4, 2002.
14 “Report: 9/11 Hijacker Bypassed FAA,” AP story, June 13, 2002.
15 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 242.
17 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 242.
19 Phone conversation with Marcel Bernard, June 26, 2009.
20 Phone conversation with Ben Conner, June 28, 2009.
21 The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 226-227.
22 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 530, note 147.
23 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 227.
24 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 531, note 170.
26 David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, Olive Branch Press, Northhampton, 2008, p.80.
30 Ibid., pp. 34-37.
31 Phone conversation with Marcel Bernard, June 26, 2009.
34 Phone conversation with Ben Conner, June 28, 2009.
35 The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, p. 286, note 99.